The Monroe Doctrine Returns: Trump, Maduro, and a Region Exposed
- ATN
- 3 days ago
- 4 min read
By Ahmed Fathi
NEW YORK — When U.S. forces moved to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in a cross-border operation on January 3rd, the White House described the action as a law-enforcement measure—part of a broader effort to dismantle what it characterized as a criminal state apparatus.
But outside Washington, the consequences are being read very differently.
Beyond the immediate political shock in Caracas, the operation has set off a quieter, more destabilizing chain reaction: Venezuela’s already weakened oil sector has been thrown into deeper uncertainty, and long-standing vulnerabilities across the Caribbean and parts of Central America have been laid bare.
Among diplomats and regional officials, the episode is increasingly seen not as a single enforcement action, but as a clear reassertion of U.S. control over hemispheric outcomes—one that carries economic and strategic costs for smaller states that had no seat at the table.
Oil Flows in Limbo
In the days following Maduro’s removal, Venezuela’s state oil company, PDVSA, slipped into paralysis. With no authority broadly recognized as having the mandate to approve exports or manage revenues, oil shipments slowed, according to publicly available industry reporting and official statements.
Venezuela no longer wields the global influence it once did in energy markets. Years of sanctions, underinvestment, and mismanagement have sharply reduced its output. Yet for parts of the Caribbean, Venezuelan crude and refined fuel—however diminished—still matter.
Alternative suppliers exist, but they come at a price: tighter commercial terms, higher upfront costs, and little flexibility. For countries with thin fiscal buffers, even short disruptions can ripple quickly through their economies.
Cuba Feels It First
Nowhere is the exposure more immediate than in Cuba.
Although shipments from Venezuela have declined steadily in recent years, they remain critical to Cuba’s electricity generation and transportation networks. Their loss deepens an already severe crisis marked by inflation, power outages, and shrinking public services.
Havana condemned the U.S. operation publicly, warning of regional instability. Privately, the challenge is more practical: Cuba has limited access to fuel suppliers willing to offer flexible terms and little capacity to absorb sustained spot-market prices.
It is a familiar regional dynamic—the political pressure lands on the target, while the economic fallout spreads outward.
A Caribbean Exposed — and CARICOM on Edge
For the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the concern is neither ideological loyalty to Caracas nor endorsement of Washington’s actions. It is exposure—structural, immediate, and difficult to hedge against.
Most Caribbean states import nearly all of their fuel. Strategic reserves are thin or nonexistent. Electricity grids depend heavily on oil and diesel, meaning fluctuations in energy supply or price ripple quickly through food costs, water desalination, healthcare systems, and tourism—the backbone of many island economies.
For years, that vulnerability was partially cushioned by Petrocaribe, Venezuela’s oil-financing initiative that allowed participating countries to defer payments, access low-interest credit, and smooth fiscal shocks. Petrocaribe was never a panacea, and its reach diminished steadily as Venezuela’s own crisis deepened. But even in decline, it provided flexibility—time, credit, and breathing room—that commercial markets rarely offer small states.
Those arrangements had already weakened. Maduro’s removal effectively closes the door on them.
CARICOM’s response has been cautious rather than confrontational. In public statements and diplomatic engagements, the bloc has emphasized respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law, and the need to protect regional stability and energy security—language that reflects concern without provocation.
It has stopped short of openly condemning Washington’s move, but the unease is evident. At its core is anxiety over the absence of a clear transition framework—one that acknowledges how the collapse of Venezuela’s oil role, including the final unraveling of Petrocaribe, leaves Caribbean states exposed to sudden shocks they did not design and cannot easily absorb.
Several member governments have acknowledged they are reviewing fuel procurement strategies and contingency plans, an implicit recognition that the Caribbean risks becoming an unintended shock absorber of great-power decisions—this time, without the cushion that once softened the blow.
A Doctrine Without Saying Its Name
U.S. officials have avoided invoking the Monroe Doctrine outright. Still, its logic is unmistakable across the region.
First articulated in 1823 under President James Monroe, the doctrine warned outside powers against interference in the Western Hemisphere. Over time, it evolved into a framework through which Washington asserted primacy over political and strategic outcomes in the Americas.
Today, it operates less through speeches than through policy design. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy frames the Western Hemisphere as a core U.S. security domain, explicitly warning against rival state influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The emphasis is clear: prevent alternative power centers from taking root, and act decisively when they do.
In practice, that has meant sanctions, asset seizures, extraterritorial prosecutions—and now, the removal of a sitting head of state.
The message is widely understood autonomy in the hemisphere has limits.
More Than Venezuela
The Maduro operation fits a broader pattern. By sidelining Venezuela, Washington weakens one of Cuba’s remaining external lifelines and removes a financial and energy backstop for parts of Central America.
Countries that once used Venezuelan partnerships to diversify their options now face deeper reliance on U.S.-aligned markets and institutions. Energy, once a tool of cooperation and development, is increasingly a source of leverage.
Calculated Risk
The Trump administration says it does not intend to govern Venezuela directly, but will oversee a transition while keeping tight control over oil revenues.
Energy analysts have warned publicly that restoring Venezuela’s production capacity would take years and billions of dollars in investment. Until then, the region absorbs the shock.
For small states, this is not about ideology. It is about keeping the lights on.
As one Caribbean official put it bluntly this week: when fuel disappears, everything else follows.
The Question Left Behind
In Washington, Maduro’s capture is being hailed as a decisive strike against authoritarianism. Elsewhere, the view is more complicated.
What has also been dismantled is a fragile energy arrangement that—however imperfect—kept parts of the Caribbean functioning.
The Monroe Doctrine may no longer be spoken aloud. But in practice, it is shaping outcomes once again—through enforcement, energy disruption, and the narrowing of choices.
For the Caribbean, the question now is not who governs Venezuela, but who will supply the fuel—and at what cost. Shapes the region’s fragile energy balance.