Trump-Xi Summit Puts Taiwan, Iran and Global Power Politics in the Room (1/4)
- 24 hours ago
- 5 min read
By Ahmed Fathi
New York, NY: President Donald Trump’s planned visit to Beijing this week is being framed around trade, tariffs, and possible economic deliverables. That is the easy version of the story. The harder version is that Trump is going to China at a moment when the world’s two largest powers are testing whether rivalry can still be managed without sliding into open confrontation. Trump-Xi Summit
Trump is expected to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on May 14–15, in what analysts see as a modest but significant attempt to stabilize the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) says the United States is expected to focus on the economy and Iran, while China will seek stability in the relationship and progress on Taiwan.
That distinction matters. This is not 2017, when Trump’s first China visit was wrapped in ceremony, flattery, and the language of personal chemistry. This second Trump-Xi encounter in Beijing comes under harder conditions: trade conflict, Taiwan anxiety, technology restrictions, rare earth leverage, the Iran war, pressure on global energy markets, and deepening distrust between Washington and Beijing.
The summit is not just about whether Trump can get a better deal. It is about whether he can avoid giving away more than he gets.
For Washington, the immediate agenda is clear. Trump wants visible results. He wants economic concessions, Chinese purchases, movement on fentanyl, access to critical minerals, and possibly cooperation on Iran. The White House will likely present the visit as proof that Trump’s personal diplomacy can force Beijing back to the table.
But Beijing is not arriving empty-handed. China enters the summit with its leverage, including control over critical mineral supply chains, economic ties with Iran, and the ability to calm or inflame tensions around Taiwan. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) argues that China may have the upper hand heading into the summit, partly because the Iran war has increased global instability while Beijing retains leverage through critical minerals and energy diplomacy.
Xi’s objective is different from Trump’s. He does not need a dramatic announcement. He needs recognition that China must be treated as an equal great power, not as a problem to be contained. Beijing wants stability with Washington, but on terms that protect what it calls its core interests.
At the center of those interests is Taiwan.
Chinese officials have made that point repeatedly ahead of the summit. Beijing has said the United States must honor its commitments and handle Taiwan carefully, while Chinese state media has stressed that Taiwan remains central to China-U.S. relations.
That creates the most dangerous diplomatic space in the summit. The concern is not that Trump will formally abandon Taiwan. The concern is that his transactional style may encourage Beijing to seek softer U.S. language, delayed arms sales, or a quiet understanding that reduces pressure on China in exchange for cooperation elsewhere.
CSIS notes that Beijing may seek explicit U.S. agreement to restrict arms sales to Taiwan or press for a change in long-standing U.S. language that China can portray as a political win. It also says Taiwan will be watching closely for any shift in how Washington describes the cross-strait relationship.
In Asia, words are not decorative. A phrase can reassure allies, unsettle markets, or invite military testing.
Iran adds another layer. The war has complicated Trump’s position because China maintains significant ties with Tehran while also depending on stability in Gulf energy flows. Beijing has an interest in preventing a wider conflict, but it also has no reason to act as Washington’s subcontractor.
China will likely encourage Trump to reach an arrangement that restores stability in the Strait of Hormuz, but it will avoid appearing to pressure Iran on Washington’s behalf. That gives Xi room to bargain. If Washington wants Chinese help restraining Iran, keeping oil moving or reopening diplomatic pathways, Beijing will ask what it receives in return.
The answer could involve tariffs, sanctions, technology controls, or Taiwan-related language.
This is why the visit carries risk beyond the bilateral relationship. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Europe, and Middle Eastern states will all watch for signs that Trump and Xi are creating a private great-power bargain. Smaller and middle powers do not fear only the confrontation between Washington and Beijing. They also fear arrangements made without their knowledge.
Technology is another battlefield. The dispute over semiconductors, artificial intelligence, export controls, and rare earths is now inseparable from national security. Tariffs may dominate the press conferences, but chips and minerals are the architecture of future power. A trade truce without clarity on technology competition would calm markets temporarily while leaving the core rivalry untouched.
Brookings has framed the summit around several issues to watch, including whether the meeting lowers tensions, what working-level processes are launched, and how both sides handle the more profound issues of Taiwan, trade, rare earths, and global crisis management.
That is the most realistic measure of success. This summit will not resolve U.S.-China competition. It may only determine whether the competition becomes more predictable.
For China, predictability is useful. It allows Beijing time to strengthen its economy, deepen global partnerships, and continue expanding its diplomatic reach. For Trump, predictability is politically useful only if it comes with visible wins. That mismatch matters. Xi can leave the summit with atmospherics. Trump needs deliverables.
The danger is that deliverables become the trap.
A purchase agreement, a temporary tariff pause, or a statement on Iran may look like victory in Washington. But if the price is softer deterrence in Asia, weaker allied confidence, or ambiguity on Taiwan, the strategic cost could exceed the economic gain.
This is the central question of the Beijing visit: is Trump trying to stabilize rivalry or monetize it?
There is a difference.
Stabilizing rivalry requires discipline, clear red lines, allied reassurance, and a willingness to separate crisis management from core security commitments. Monetizing rivalry means mixing every issue into one bargain: Taiwan for trade, Iran for rare earths, tariffs for silence, stability for deference.
Xi will test what Trump has brought to Beijing.
The summit may produce polite language, limited agreements, and images of two powerful leaders claiming control over the world’s most important bilateral relationship. But the real outcome may lie in the fine print or in what we leave unsaid.
If Taiwan becomes blurred, allies will notice. If Iran is traded into the conversation, Gulf capitals will notice. If technology controls soften, markets and security agencies will notice. If the statement avoids hard questions altogether, that silence will also carry meaning.
This is the first in a planned ATN series examining the global stakes of Trump’s China visit. The next pieces will look at how Japan and South Korea are reading the summit through Taiwan, North Korea, and alliance credibility; how the Middle East and North Africa are watching through Iran, oil, maritime security, and the limits of strategic hedging; and how Europe is assessing the risks for Ukraine, trade, NATO and its own uneasy relationship with China.
Trump may arrive in Beijing looking for a deal. Xi will be looking for something larger: proof that America’s pressure campaign has limits.
And in that contest, the photo-op may be the least important part of the visit.
**About the Author: Ahmed Fathi is an internationally syndicated journalist, United Nations correspondent, global affairs analyst, and human rights commentator. He writes about diplomacy, multilateralism, power, public freedoms, and the politics shaping our global future.