The Security Council Elected Ten Are No Longer Playing Along

By Ahmed Fathi

UNHQ, New York: For years, the rhythm of the Security Council has been predictable. The permanent members set the tone. The elected members listened, adjusted, and worked the margins. That dynamic is beginning to shift.

A close reading of In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2025 and the Year Ahead, published by Security Council Report in late December 2025, points to a development that has largely escaped public attention: the elected ten members of the Council, known as the E10, are increasingly acting in coordination rather than in isolation.

This is not symbolism. It is showing up in how texts are drafted, how positions are aligned, and how political space inside the Council is being used.

A new behavior taking shape

The report notes that in 2025 all ten elected members jointly drafted two resolutions on Gaza. Both drafts failed after being vetoed by the United States. But the significance lies less in the outcome and more in the process. Collective drafting by the E10 has historically been rare. Today, it is becoming more deliberate.

This was not an isolated moment. The report links this behavior to a practice established the previous year, when the E10 jointly authored resolution 2728 calling for a ceasefire during Ramadan. That resolution was adopted. Together, these episodes suggest that elected members are no longer content to operate as ten separate voices.

They are beginning to operate as a group.

From temporary seats to collective presence

There is no formal alliance among the E10. No agreed platform. No official coordination mechanism. Yet something more subtle is emerging: a shared sense of role.

Security Council Report explicitly refers to a “growing sense of identity among the E10 members.” That phrase matters. It reflects a change in mindset. Elected members are starting to view themselves not just as rotating participants but as custodians of the Council’s credibility.

The driver is frustration. Repeated paralysis on Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, and Myanmar has left many delegations asking a basic question: if the Council cannot function as designed, what responsibility do elected members carry?

The emerging answer appears to be this: more than before.

Gaza and the limits of paralysis

Gaza offers the clearest example of this shift.

According to the report, the E10 drafts in mid-2025 attracted support from 14 of the 15 Council members. Only one veto prevented their adoption. Politically, that sends a clear message about where the balance of opinion inside the Council actually sits.

The fact that the elected members were the authors of those drafts matters. They were not waiting for a permanent member to lead. They were not simply reacting to texts tabled by others. They were initiating.

That is a different posture.

Even in failure, those drafts demonstrated that the E10 can function as an agenda-setting force, not merely as participants in negotiations shaped by others.

Coordination beyond crisis files

The report also documents similar coordination on thematic issues. On women, peace and security, nine Council members sustained joint initiatives through coordinated stakeouts. On climate, peace and security, nine members again acted collectively to shape messaging. On peacekeeping, Denmark, Pakistan, and the Republic of Korea launched a joint initiative explicitly designed to elevate elected members’ influence on future operations.

These actions are easy to overlook. They do not carry the drama of vetoes or emergency meetings. But they matter because they reveal habit-building. Diplomacy, like any institution, is shaped as much by routines as by formal rules.

The E10 are developing new routines.

Why this matters now

The Security Council is entering 2026 in a fragile state. Resolution output is down. Unanimity is eroding. Internal processes have broken down, as illustrated by the unprecedented delay in appointing subsidiary body chairs. The Council’s legitimacy is increasingly questioned.

In this environment, elected members may represent the last remaining space for initiative inside the institution. The permanent members are locked into strategic competition. Their positions are often immovable. Elected members, by contrast, still have room to maneuver, to build bridges, and to experiment with new forms of coordination.

This does not mean they can overcome the veto. But it does mean they can influence what the Council debates, how it debates, and how the outside world perceives those debates.

That influence is not insignificant.

A quiet but meaningful evolution

Nothing in the report suggests a dramatic transformation. The power structure of the Council remains unchanged. But what is visible is a gradual behavioral shift.

Elected members are coordinating more. Drafting more. Appearing together more often. Thinking collectively about their role.

This is not formal reform. It is practical adaptation.

And in a Council struggling to remain relevant, adaptation may matter more than any stalled reform process.

The story of the Security Council in 2025 is often told as a story of decline, division, and dysfunction. Much of that is justified. But within that larger story sits a smaller, overlooked development: a group of elected members who are no longer content to remain on the sidelines.

They are not challenging the structure. They are working within it. Quietly, steadily, and with increasing confidence.

It is not a revolution. But it is a shift. And it is one worth watching.