From Hormuz to Suez, MENA Watches Trump-Xi Summit for the Price of Stability (3/4)
- May 13
- 5 min read
By Ahmed Fathi
New York, NY: President Donald Trump’s summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing will be watched across the Middle East and North Africa through a question larger than trade: can Washington and Beijing reduce pressure around Iran and global shipping without turning the region into a bargaining table? MENA
For MENA, the issue is not only a Gulf story. It is a map of chokepoints and exposed economies, from the Strait of Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb; from the Red Sea to the Suez Canal; and from Gulf energy markets to North African ports, budgets, and food prices.
The Iran file has moved close to the center of the Trump-Xi agenda. The United States and China have agreed that no country should impose tolls on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, according to a U.S. State Department statement reported by Reuters. That is a rare point of alignment between Washington and Beijing, but it does not resolve the issue. Iran still understands that Hormuz is leverage. The world understands the bill when we use that leverage.
For Gulf capitals, the calculation is direct. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman need safe maritime routes, stable energy markets, and protection of infrastructure. They also need both powers: the United States for robust security and China for trade, investment, technology, and energy demand.
Saudi Arabia enters this moment as the region’s central oil power but also tries to avoid being dragged into a wider war. Any disruption in Hormuz affects global prices, Asian customers, and the long-term credibility of the Gulf energy supply. Saudi Aramco has leaned on routes that bypass Hormuz, including the East-West pipeline to the Red Sea, but even that does not remove the wider market shock. The Saudi interest is clear: de-escalation, open routes, and no regional firestorm that forces Riyadh into a direct confrontation. (New York Post)
The UAE has a different exposure. It is both an energy producer and a regional logistics hub, with ports, finance, aviation, shipping, and investment all tied to confidence in Gulf stability. Iranian attacks and disruptions have already put pressure on energy infrastructure and forced Abu Dhabi to think in military, economic, and diplomatic terms at the same time. ADNOC has also sought to protect operations through alternative logistics, including land routes and the port of Fujairah, which gives the UAE some room outside Hormuz but not immunity from regional escalation. (Reuters)
Qatar’s vulnerability is even more specific: liquefied natural gas. QatarEnergy's exports from Ras Laffan and LNG flows through the Strait of Hormuz are important not only for Gulf markets but also for Asia and Europe. Recent Qatari LNG shipments have crossed Hormuz despite the conflict, including cargoes bound for Pakistan, but the fact that such movements now require close monitoring shows how quickly normal trade can become crisis management. (Reuters)
Oman’s role is quieter but important. Muscat sits beside the same strategic waterway and often serves as a channel when others are shouting. Iranian and Omani officials reportedly held talks in Muscat on shipping safety and vessel navigation through Hormuz. That is Oman’s familiar diplomatic lane: quiet facilitation, practical de-escalation, and keeping channels open when louder actors raise the temperature. (The Wall Street Journal)
China is trying to present itself as a stabilizer. Beijing has influence with Tehran, but not control over it. It buys energy, maintains political channels, and wants to protect Gulf relationships without becoming the region’s security guarantor. That posture serves China well. It provides Beijing a diplomatic role without assuming the burdens Washington has carried for decades.
But the region will judge China by outcomes, not vocabulary. If Beijing helps keep Hormuz open, its influence rises. If it shields Iran while asking Gulf partners to trust Chinese diplomacy, the balance becomes harder to defend.
Egypt sees the crisis from both ends of the maritime chain. When ships avoid Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, Egypt profits through the Suez Canal. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi said Egypt has lost about $10 billion in canal revenues because of attacks on shipping linked to the Gaza war and disruption around Bab el-Mandeb. (The Guardian)
Egypt is also signaling that it has a role in Gulf security. Regional reporting recently showed Egyptian Rafale fighter jets deployed in the UAE during Sisi’s visit. That carries a strategic and human dimension: well over 7 million Egyptians live in GCC countries, including a large community in the UAE. For Cairo, Gulf stability is about Arab security, Suez revenue, remittances, and protecting citizens. Reports of a wider Egyptian military presence in four Gulf states should be handled cautiously, but the direction is clear: Egypt does not want to watch a Gulf crisis from the balcony.
Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia add another layer. They are not side notes. They sit along or near the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden corridor, where weak state capacity, war, armed groups, and outside competition make maritime security harder to manage. U.S. maritime authorities warned commercial vessels in the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Somali Basin to remain alert to hazards linked to Houthi attacks. (The Guardian)
That corridor connects several crises at once: Yemen’s war, Sudan’s collapse, instability around the Horn of Africa, shipping pressure in the Red Sea, and the wider contest over ports, bases, and influence. A Trump-Xi bargain that treats the region only as an energy route would miss the point. These are not empty waterways. They are political fault lines with countries on both shores.
Morocco offers a unique perspective from North Africa. Rabat is not exposed to Hormuz in the same way as Gulf exporters or Asian energy importers. But Morocco is exposed to the industrial side of U.S.-China competition. Chinese investment in Morocco’s battery and electric vehicle supply chains has grown sharply, including a reported $5.6 billion. Chinese-backed battery gigafactory project.
That places Morocco inside the new geography of great-power competition: ports, batteries, green technology, Europe-Africa trade routes, and supply chains. For Rabat, China is not only a diplomatic actor. It is an industrial partner. But that also means the U.S.-China rivalry can complicate Morocco’s ambitions to become a manufacturing bridge between Africa, Europe, and global markets.
This is why the MENA view of the Trump-Xi summit cannot be reduced to Iran. Iran matters because Hormuz is important. Hormuz matters because energy markets do. But the chain does not stop there. It runs through Bab el-Mandeb, Suez, the Red Sea, Gulf security, North African economies, and China’s expanding commercial footprint.
The region’s preferred outcome is practical: keep Hormuz open, reduce the risk of U.S.-Iran escalation, protect Red Sea shipping, stabilize energy prices, and avoid forcing states to choose between Washington and Beijing.
The worst outcome is also clear: a summit that calms U.S.-China relations on paper while leaving the region to absorb the risk at sea, in markets, and on already strained budgets.
This is the third article in an ATN series examining the global stakes of Trump’s China visit. The first looked at Taiwan, Iran, and the broader U.S.-China power contest. The second examined how Japan and South Korea are watching the summit through Taiwan, North Korea, Hormuz, and U.S. alliance credibility. The final piece will look at Europe’s concerns over Ukraine, trade, NATO and China policy.
For the Middle East and North Africa, the Trump-Xi summit is not about who wins the room in Beijing. It is about who pays if the room fails.
**About the Author: Ahmed Fathi is an internationally syndicated journalist, United Nations correspondent, global affairs analyst, and human rights commentator. He writes about diplomacy, multilateralism, power, public freedoms, and the politics shaping our global future.